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1 Introduction
Public policies aimed at limiting global warming have been introduced by a considerable number of countries ever since the beginning of the Nineties (Fullerton et
al. 2010, 427 and Anderson 2001, 16). Their main target has been the reduction
of the use of fossil fuels as they represent a major contributor to the increase of
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, the principal driver of global warming
(IPCC 2007, 36 and 39). Standard policy measures implemented on the national
and international level generally consist of a tax, a cap-and-trade system, a subsidy
or a regulation to promote low carbon or highly-efficient technologies (Fölster
and Nyström 2010, 224). In the light of the scientific evidence concerning global
warming, the efforts undertaken are reasonable and have been insufficient. This
emerges from the latest Assessment Report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel
of Climate Change that forecasts a temperature increase between 1.8 and 4.0◦ C
at the end of the century, if no further policies are introduced, which would have
unpredictable consequences for human and natural systems (IPCC 2007, 44/45
and 48-54).
Economists have raised several concerns regarding the effectiveness of the standard
policy approach in terms of world wide emission control. One important argument
was been formulated in 1992 by Peter Sinclair and focused on the effectiveness of a
carbon tax. He argued that a carbon tax may be redundant or even damaging for
climate change issues. The main insight of this comes from the theory of exhaustible
resource extraction (Sinclair 1992, 41). Within a standard Hotelling model, the
author derived that a carbon tax is only effective if it is decreasing over time. The
reason is that fossil fuel owners have a finite quantity of resources and hence their
decision of how much to extract today depends not only on the current tax rate,
but also on the future tax level.
In a more recent contribution, Hans-Werner Sinn (2008) used the insights of the
theory of exhaustible resource extraction to analyze the effect of the current policy
approach to combat climate change. He concluded in his well-regarded article “Public Policies against global warming: a supply side approach” that climate policies
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undertaken in Kyoto countries may be redundant or may even worsen the problem
of climate change (ibid., 360). The author argued that the fundamental reason for
this is that most of the measures – such as a tax on fuel consumption or a subsidy
for low carbon energy supply – are aimed at reducing fossil fuel demand and thereby
lead to a decline in fossil fuel prices (ibid., 388). Sinn warned that if fossil fuel
owners expect climate policies to become stricter over time and hence expect prices
in the farer future to decline more than in the present and nearer future, they may
decide to bring forward the sales of their fossil fuels. Consequentially, atmospheric
greenhouse gas accumulation occurs faster and thereby worsens the problem of
climate change – a phenomenon that he denominated a ‘Green Paradox’ (ibid.).
Within a Hotelling model with a given fossil fuel stock, stock-depending extraction
costs and no backstop technology, Sinn (2008) analyzed different tax schemes and
concluded that an increasing cash flow tax as well as a sales tax with a sufficiently
high growth rate lead to a Green Paradox. While total fossil fuel supply is not
impacted by these policy measures, their implementation lead to a change in the
expected (producer) price path such that it is optimal for fossil fuel owners to
extract faster. Sinn (2008) applied the result of the policy analysis regarding the
sales tax to a range of policies that lead to a decrease of fossil fuel demand based
on the argument that they constitute an equivalent effect on the producer price.
On the basis of this rationale, Sinn (ibid., 388) concluded that “measures to reduce
carbon demand, ranging from taxes on fossil fuel consumption to the development
of alternative energy sources [...] will not mitigate the problem of global warming.”
This paper contributes to the Green Paradox literature by analyzing the impact of
a climate policy on fossil fuel extraction within a Hotelling model when the resource
stock depends on exploration activity. The need to consider costly exploratory
activity in a model that aims to describe fossil fuel supply is based on observations
regarding the real world supply process. Because firms are not endowed with extractable resources, but they are stored underground, their identification (rather
than the development of the sites) is necessary before any extraction activity can
start (Bhattacharyya 2011, 191). Tools to identify fossil fuels include geographical
studies and exploratory drilling. These activities involve significant costs and a
high risk regarding the success of finding fossil fuel resources (ibid.). It has long
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been recognized that the need for capital expenditures modifies the impact of
taxation on fossil fuel supply behavior compared to when the fossil fuel stock is
fixed. Dasgupta, Heal, and Stiglitz (1980, 18) emphasized that a tax reduces profits
from fossil fuel sales and thereby lowers the overall return on capital employed in
the fossil fuel industry. In turn, this negatively affects the incentive to allocate
funds for exploration and development activities for new mines/wells and hence
decreases extractable fossil fuel resources.
The standard resource extraction model that incorporates exploration has been
derived by Pindyck (1978). In this extended Hotelling model, a competitive firm
has to decide at each point in time how much to extract and how much to invest
in exploratory activity across a finite time horizon. Exploration is the means to
maintain or increase the resource base from which the firm can extract and it
further affects extraction costs as they have a negative relationship with the size
of known reserves. Several contributions have employed the framework developed
by Pindyck (1978) to assess the effect of different tax schemes. This task has
been undertaken in simulation models (refer to Chakravorty et al. 2010, Deacon
1993, Kunce et al. 2003, Yücel 1986). While most of these studies simulate the
impact of a state’s taxes on the national supply (and hence treat the price path
as exogenous), only the contribution of Yücel (1986) examines the impact of a
worldwide tax on global fossil fuel supply. To do this, he examined the effect of
a constant severance tax on the supply path of a representative competitive firm
within the framework presented in Pindyck (1978). Yücel (1986) shows that both,
extraction and exploration activity, are reduced at any point in time compared
to the business-as-usual scenario (Yücel 1986, 205). However, the main reason
why it is not reasonable to compare Yücel’s results to those of Sinn (2008) is the
assumption regarding the optimality to extract across a finite time horizon.
Formal models that allow analyze the impact of a tax or a change in the expected
price path analytically are rare. Neher (1990, 325/326) proposed a Hotelling model
where exploratory activities are possible at each point in time in order to add new
discoveries to the resource base. Without formally deriving the supply path, Neher
(ibid.) concluded that the implementation of a profit tax lead to a decrease in
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overall exploratory activities and thereby shrunk the total fossil fuel available. His
main assumptions, however, were not in line with Sinn (2008) as he assumes an
exogenously given price path and an optimal extraction horizon that is finite.
Venables (2011) recently extended the standard Hotelling model (with no backstop
technology) to incorporate costly exploration and development activities. Firms can
add new discoveries to their fossil fuel stock by opening new fields, hence incurring
capital expenses. The firm has to decide how much to extract at each point in
time and when to open new fields. Venables (ibid., 17) showed that a demand
decrease (equivalent to the implementation of a sales tax) leads to a permanent
decrease in the amount extracted and therefore results in an effective climate policy.
This paper presents the typical resource extraction model that underlies the Green
Paradox and is the framework within the article of Sinn (2008). Furthermore, the
paper provides two extensions of the framework and analyzes whether the Green
Paradox remains robust. The first extension considers the existence of a backstop
technology. It will be shown that one of the results obtained by Sinn (2008) regarding the neutrality of a sales tax that grows with a specific rate significantly changes
if a backstop technology exists. In particular, if a backstop technology exists, the
implementation of this specific tax scheme leads to a lower amount extracted at each
point in time compared to the baseline scenario and hence represents an effective
instrument for climate change mitigation. Second, the framework employed by Sinn
(2008) is extended to take into account that in reality firms are not ‘endowed’ with
fossil fuels, but instead have to undertake costly exploratory activity before any
extraction may start. While Sinn (2008) has been extended in various directions by
applying the main insights of the exhaustible resource theory (refer for example to
Edenhofer and Kalkuhl 2011, Gerlagh 2011, and Hoel 2010), the author is unaware
of a contribution that captures exploration activities. This paper represents a first
step in this direction by providing a Hotelling model of resource extraction that
incorporates exploration using the framework presented in Lasserre (1991, 104-106),
that is also equivalent to the approach already used by Heaps and Helliwell (1985,
452/453). Both contributions focus on the endogeneity of the reserve base as a result
of exploration efforts that are undertaken prior to the extraction phase. The firm
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must choose in a first phase the optimal amount of investment in exploration and, in
a second phase, the optimal extraction program in such a way as to maximize total
discounted profits from extraction (net of cumulative expenditures in exploration).
Within this framework, the impact of an increasing cash flow tax on the supply
decisions is explored. A key result is that while an increasing cash flow tax leads to
a Green Paradox in the framework of Sinn (2008), it can be shown that the same
policy tends to reduce climate damages when exploration is modeled endogenously.
In particular, the risk of the appearance of a Green Paradox is still present, but can
be avoided by setting a high initial tax level and/or a very high or very low growth
rate of the tax. The different impact of an increasing cash flow tax within the two
frameworks is due to its effect on total extraction. While total extraction is not
impacted by the tax in Sinn (2008), the total extraction amount is diminished in
the Hotelling model presented in this paper that accounts for exploration activities.
The layout of the paper is the following. Chapter 2 presents the main features of the
contribution of Sinn (2008). Moreover, it extends his framework by incorporating
the existence of a backstop technology and highlights the different impact of an
increasing severance tax on the extraction behavior. Chapter 3 provides the extension of Sinn’s framework with costly exploratory activity based on the approach of
Lasserre (1991, 104-106). In this framework, the effect of an increasing cash flow
tax is analyzed and compared to the result derived by Sinn (2008) who showed
that an increasing cash flow tax undoubtedly leads to a Green Paradox. Chapter 4
provides the main conclusions of this paper.
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2 The ”Green Paradox” criticism – a focus on the
supply side
2.1 The contribution of Sinn (2008)
2.1.1 Introduction
The term Green Paradox was coined by Sinn (2008) and can be defined as the
phenomenon that arises when the implementation of a policy measure aimed at
limiting climate change leads to an accelerated extraction of fossil fuel resources.
Consequently, a faster accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere occurs,
worsening the problem of climate change (Sinn 2008, 380). The rationale for the
Green Paradox lies in the dynamics of the supply side (Gronwald et al. 2010, 2).
That is, the common feature of the paradoxical policies is that they change the
price path for fossil fuels compared to what would have prevailed without the
tax such that it is more profitable for the resource owner to extract more in the
present and near term future, thereby exacerbating climate change (Sinn 2008, 381).
In review of climate change policy, Sinn (2008) considers three mechanisms that
may lead to a Green Paradox: an incorrectly set carbon tax, policy measures
that reduce demand for fossil fuels, and the implementation of a global emission
restraint (i.e. the implementation of a global emission trading system) with a time
lag between its announcement and enforcement that provides sufficient time for
resource owners to react. The latter mechanism is only mentioned in passing, so
this paper will focus on the remaining two drivers as they are described extensively
in his contribution1 .
The first mechanism that may lead to a Green Paradox identified by Sinn (2008)
is an incorrectly set carbon tax imposed on fossil fuel owners and was previously
acknowledged by Sinclair (1992). The main drawback according to Sinn is that the
economic theory focuses on the issue of the level of the carbon tax that assures
1

Sinn (2008, 386). For a discussion refer to Di Maria et al. (2008) and Van der Werf and Di Maria
(2011).
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efficiency or yields the desired level of emissions by employing a static framework
(Sinn (2008, 366/385). According to the standard model of environmental economics,
to assure efficiency, the level of the tax should reflect all current and discounted
future damages arising from the marginal emission of greenhouse gases at the
efficient emission level (Requate 2009, 128). On the basis of this theory, Stern et
al. (2006, 309) suggest that a carbon tax should rise over time to account for the
increasing damages caused by the emissions as the stock of greenhouse gases grows.
However, Sinn (2008, 318) warned that this approach neglects the intertemporal
profit maximization calculus of fossil fuel owners, and, in the opposite, may worsen
the problem of climate change.
Second, Sinn (2008, 360) identified the current policy approach to combat climate
change that is characterized by the implementation of a set of policy measures by a
subset of countries to reduce demand for fossil fuels as a further driver of the Green
Paradox. He referred to measures such as subsidies for a wide variety of alternative
technologies (for example for wind energy, solar heating and photovoltaic panels)
and taxes on fuels that give incentives to install better insulation within buildings or
to build lighter and more fuel effcient cars (ibid., 362). Sinn (2008) also mentioned
the European Emission Trading System that has induced participating businesses
to make efficiency improvements. All these policy measures are likely to lead to a
decrease in (global) fossil fuel demand (ibid.)2 . Sinn (ibid., 360/386) warned that if
demand reduction policies in Kyoto countries are expected to become stricter and
more countries participate in the future, this would reduce the expected fossil fuel
prices such that fossil fuel firms will extract their stocks more rapidly thereby leading to a Green Paradox. This means that emission reductions induced by demand
reducing policies may be offset by higher emissions in non-complying countries
generated due to a decline in world fossil fuel prices, increasing demand in these

2

As is well known, the literature has identified several effects that countervail the effectiveness
of these policy measures to induce actually a reduce in fossil fuel demand, an aspect that is
not considered by Sinn (2008). For example, energy efficiency improvements might come along
with a list of rebound effects weakening the effectiveness of policies to reduce fossil fuel demand.
One rebound effect might be due an increase in effective energy costs due to the efficiency
improvement thereby leading to an increased use of energy (Van den Bergh [2011, 7]).
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countries and thereby increasing emissions (Sinn 2008, 363). This phenomenon has
generally been referred to as carbon leakage in the literature. However, while the
literature of carbon leakage generally identifies strategic behavior of the demand
side as a major driver for carbon leakage (Babiker and Rutherford 2005, Dröge et
al. 2010), Sinn (2008) refers to the strategic behavior of the supply side to cause
the carbon leakage problem. Note that his Green Paradox criticism is still valid
even for a fully enforced global plan of demand reducing measures that may have
the same paradoxical effect based on his assumptions.
The common feature of the two drivers that may lead to a Green Paradox presented
extensively in Sinn (2008) can be identified by their identical effect on the producer
price path. It is straightforward to see that both drivers potentially lead to a change
in the expected (producer) price path. According to the theory of exhaustible
resources, resource owners maximize their profits by choosing an optimal extraction
path over time. Under this presumption, the implementation of a carbon tax as
well as any demand reducing policy, exert two countervailing effects (ibid., 377). On
the one hand, current extraction is lowered as there is a depression of the current
price of the fossil fuel resource. On the other hand, it increases the incentive to
extract today because the anticipated future price decreases and this reduces the
value of the resource in situ. Only if the former effect dominates the latter, the
policy is expected to curtail greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate global warming.
2.1.2 Climate policy analysis
Sinn (2008, 389/374) employed a Hotelling model to analyze different tax schemes
in terms of their effectiveness to mitigate climate change3 . To do this, he derived the
optimal extraction path in a competitive industry without a tax and compares the
result to the extraction paths that would be optimal within four policy scenarios: the
implementation of a constant and increasing cash flow tax, and the implementation
3

See in particular Sinn (2008, 389 and 374) for his assumptions. While he explicitly considers
uncertain property rights in his framework, this feature is omitted in the description of his model
here as it does not give further insight regarding the Green Paradox issue. In particular, he
assumed that the representative fossil fuel owner faces an expropriation risk what modifies his
optimal extraction plan by extracting faster (ibid., 370/371).
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of a constant and increasing sales tax. Sinn (2008) assumes that there exists
a representative competitive firm which possesses a fixed and known stock of
homogeneous non-renewable resource reflecting fossil fuel energy supplies, denoted
by S0 with subscripts referring to time. The firm’s objective is to maximize the
discounted profit from extracting the stock. Profits at each point in time t are
obtained by extracting an amount of fossil, Rt , and selling them for the market
price, Pt . Extraction costs for one unit of fossil fuels depend only on the size of the
fossil fuel stock in the ground. Because there exists no backstop technology, it is
optimal for the firm to extract its resource over an infinite time horizon. The profit
maximizing firm chooses an extraction path that satisfy the Hotelling rule that is
given by (refer to Appendix A for the formal derivation)
Ṗt = r · [Pt − g(St )].

(1)

To derive the unique absolute extraction levels for each period, Rt , two further
pieces of informations in addition to the relative equilibrium price path and the
optimal time frame of extraction are needed; namely the demand function and the
total amount of fossil fuel extracted. While the demand function is by assumption
D(Pt ) with the characteristics specified above, the optimal amount extracted is
given by the initial stock, S0 (formally proved in Appendix A).
In his contribution, Sinn (2008) analyzed the effect of a constant and an increasing
cash flow tax as well as a constant and an increasing sales tax within the framework
presented above. His main objective was to identify the policy measures that lead
to a Green Paradox and those that result in effective climate change mitigation.
Note that the results obtained by the policy analysis regarding the sales tax can
be applied to any policy measure that lead to a decrease of the fossil fuel price.
This is clear because a sales tax shrinks the producer price at any time by the
fraction corresponding to the tax rate and, equivalently, a demand reduce shrinks
the producer price. If the implementation of any of the tax schemes results in
a steeper (relative) price path compared to the business-as-usual path, a Green
Paradox occurs. More fossil fuels are extracted in earlier periods, hence worsening
the climate change problem and this is what Sinn (2008) coined as Green Paradox.

9

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper664

10

Österle: Fossil Fuel Extraction and Climate Policy: A Review of the G

This holds as the optimal amount extracted over all time periods, as well as the
optimal time horizon of extraction is unchanged by the tax. In particular, a steeper
price path determines a lower initial price level and a higher growth rate of the
price. Such a price path implies – via the underlying demand function – that more
extraction occurs in the present and near term future compared to the business-asusual scenario; the stock is extracted faster and a Green Paradox is manifested.
On the other hand, a flatter price path infers an initial price that is higher and
increases with a lower rate of extraction compared to the business-as-usual scenario
manifesting in an effective instrument to combat climate change.
First, Sinn (2008, 377/378) showed formally that the implementation of a constant
cash flow tax does not change the optimal price path; a well established result
of the literature of nonrenewable resource extraction. The implementation of an
increasing cash flow tax leads to a steeper extraction path and hence generates a
Green Paradox (ibid., 379). A steeper price path results in a steeper extraction
path, with more extraction today and the near future and less in the farer future.
This is intuitive as the firm can avoid relatively higher tax levels in the future by
extracting its resources more rapidly. The higher the growth rate of the tax, the
faster the fossil fuels are exploited. From this result is clear that a decreasing cash
flow tax leads to a flatter extraction path in this framework and is an effective
measure to limit climate change. A constant sales tax with a constant tax factor
leads to a flatter extraction path (Sinn 2008, 378). A sales tax reduces the value
of a unit of fossil fuel extracted. The intuition of the constant sales tax is given
as follows. Consider that a constant sales tax differs from a cash flow tax only
insofar that extraction costs are not tax exempt (ibid.). The cash flow component is
neutral as shown before. However, the additional tax burden (derived from the non
exemption of the cost) is decreasing if extraction is postponed to the future. This is
true because the cost only depends on the previous extraction activities and not on
time. The tax burden can hence be lowered by postponing the extraction decision
to later periods as this leads to lower (discounted) extraction costs and hence to a
lower tax burden. The incentive to postpone extraction is greater, the higher the
fraction of extraction costs to the price and the higher the tax rate. The reallocation
leads to higher prices in the present and lower prices in the future in comparison to
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the business-as-usual path; thus, the price path becomes flatter. Finally, consider an
increasing sales tax. Compared to the business-as-usual path stated in equation (1),
it is ambiguous if an increasing sales tax leads to a steeper or flatter price path. The
borderline case where taxation is neutral for the extraction path is characterized
by an absolute tax wedge that increases ”so that the discounted revenue loss per
unit of the extracted resource is constant over time” (ibid., 379) and that is given
by a growth rate of (r − ṖPtt ) (refer to Appendix A for the formal proof).
2.1.3 A graphical representation
Figure 1 depicts three possible extraction paths that are optimal in the businessas-usual scenario, with an increasing cash flow tax, and with a decreasing cash flow
tax (refer to Appendix A for the formal proof).

Figure 1: Optimal extraction paths
Since the same stock is extracted in the different scenarios, the areas under the
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respective curve must be identical. This requires the extraction path to either be
identical, or to start at different extraction levels and then to intersect the others
once. From the discussion above it is clear that the extraction path for an increasing
cash flow tax starts at a higher initial level compared to the other two scenarios,
and hence generates a Green Paradox. The extraction path in the policy scenario
with the decreasing cash flow tax starts with the lowest initial level and decreases
at the slowest rate. That is, until the time where this extraction path intersect with
the business-as-usual scenario, the total amount of fossil fuels extracted is lower. It
is clear that this represents an effective policy tool for climate change problems.
2.1.4 Conclusion
By examining several tax schemes in an extended Hotelling framework, Sinn (ibid.,
388) concluded that ”measures to reduce carbon demand, ranging from taxes on
fossil fuel consumption to the development of alternative energy sources will not
mitigate the problem of global warming”. Instead, Sinn (ibid., 382-386) proposed
to implement alternative policy instruments that either make it more attractive to
leave the fossil fuels in the ground (for example through subsidies for the resource
stock) or that make it less attractive to extract (for example through the taxation
of capital income). He also suggests a world-wide emission trading system that
limits the total amount extracted representing an effective policy tool.
The framework used by Sinn (2008) constructs an idealized world and any prediction
concerning the policy effects on the extraction behavior only applies to the idealized
world (Perman et al. 2003). On this basis, it is interesting to investigate the impact
of policy measures under different assumptions. This has been completed in a group
of recent publications that rely on the literature of exhaustible resources (refer to
Van der Werf and Di Maria, 2011 for examples). At this point, it is worth to focus
on one assumption that might considerably weaken the appearance of the Green
Paradox – the existence of a backstop technology.
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2.2 The existence of a backstop technology
2.2.1 The impact of a cheaper backstop technology
The framework proposed by Sinn (2008) assumes a positive demand for fossil
resources for arbitrarily high prices. This reflects the assumption that there is no
possibility of the emergence of a backstop technology. According to Nordhaus (1973,
532) who coined the term, a backstop technology is a technology that constitutes
a perfect substitute to the fossil fuel energy resource and is not constrained by
exhaustibility. The existence of a backstop technology together with increasing
extraction costs determine the economic exhaustion of the fossil fuel resource,
rather than the physical one (Perman et al. 2003, 524/525). Perman et al. (2003)
described that this is due to the existence of a choke price that coincides with
the cost for producing the backstop technology. For this price, demand for fossil
fuels will be completely replaced by the backstop technology. The existence of a
backstop technology in an economy such as that considered in Sinn (2008) where
extraction costs increase with cumulative extraction implies that the fossil fuel
stock will not be exhausted completely. Instead, fossil fuels that can only be extracted by incurring costs that are higher than the choke price, are left in the ground.
Several contributions published recently have assessed the effect of climate policy
measures on extraction behavior while allowing for a backstop technology that
differs in terms of its availability and their cost function [see for example Gerlagh
(2011), Grafton et al. (2010) and Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011)]. Most of the
contributions analyze the impact of decreasing costs for the backstop technology obtained by climate policies. From the explanation above it is clear that any decrease
in the cost to produce the backstop technology means that the choke price decreases
and hence the fossil fuel price for the firm in the terminal period will decrease as
well. According to Neher (1990, 323), in the terminal period production ceases, that
is, the firm’s optimal decision is to extract nothing given by the optimality condition
to produce a quantity for which the choke price just covers the marginal profit of
extraction. From this condition, the ‘cutoff’ grade can be determined, that is, the
amount of fossil fuels remaining in the ground (ibid.). This is true because in the
last period, the price equals marginal extraction costs and the size of the marginal
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extraction costs determines the amount of fossil fuel remaining in the ground as
they are decreasing in the stock. Hence, any decrease in the backstop price leads to
a decrease of optimal marginal extraction costs in the last period and in turn determines a higher ‘cut-off’ grade; that is a lower total amount of fossil fuels is extracted.
The literature shows that a decrease in the backstop price may not only generate a
volume effect, but also a change in the intertemporal distribution of extraction and
thereby potentially increasing initial extraction. While in the framework of Sinn
(2008) an increase in the initial extraction level was undoubtedly harmful for the
the climate, however, with a backstop this is not clear-cut because of the volume
effect. This led Gerlagh (2011, 82) to distinguish between a weak and a strong
Green Paradox. The weak Green Paradox refers to the short term effect of the
policy measure and is generated if the current and near future extraction activity
(and hence emissions) increase compared to the business-as-usual case. However,
the increase in current emissions may not be a substantial concern in the long run.
If extraction in the future significantly decreases, long-term damages may be less
severe compared to the business-as-usual scenario. While the weak Green Paradox
refers to an immediate effect – the short-term increase in emissions – the strong
Green Paradox measures the total damage on the climate via a damage function.
In a framework similar to Sinn (2008), Gerlagh (2011) explored the appearance of
both paradoxes with a policy induced decrease in the backstop price. He concluded
that in a competitive economy with stock dependent extraction costs and an
inexhaustible backstop technology that is supplied competitively with constant
marginal costs, any decrease in the backstop price leads to a weak Green Paradox,
but not to a strong Green Paradox (ibid., 89-92). In addition, Gerlagh (ibid., 85-88)
showed that a weak and strong Green Paradox is generated by a cheaper backstop
technology if extraction costs are constant. In both scenarios, the volume effect
more than compensates the initial emission increase due to higher extraction in
the initial periods.
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2.2.2 The impact of an increasing sales tax
This section shows the result of Sinn (2008) regarding the impact of a sales tax that
is increasing over time with (r − P̂t ) changes if a backstop technology is available.
In this case, extraction activities stop as soon as the price no longer covers marginal
extraction costs and this condition establishes the amount of reserves left in the
ground (Lasserre 1991, 90/91). Within such a framework, the result drawn by Sinn
(2008) regarding the neutrality of this specific sales tax scheme (or, equivalently, a
demand reducing policy measure) significantly changes because it loses its neutral
character. In effect, it can be shown that the total amount of fossil fuels extracted
decreases, while the optimal relative price path is not impacted. Hence, the tax lead
to a lower extraction at any point in time compared to the business-as-usual scenario.
All assumptions of Sinn (2008) presented in chapter 2.1 remain valid beside the
assumption of the non existence of a backstop technology4 . The choke price for
which fossil fuel demand becomes zero is given by Pt . Denote the tax rate of the
sales tax by τt , the market price by Pt , the extraction cost function by g(St ) and
refer to the amount extracted at any t by Rt . With the choice of Rt and T (T being
the terminal period), the competitive firm solves
Z
max

T

[Pt − τt · Pt − g(St )] · Rt · e−rt dt,

(2)

0

subject to the resource constraint
Ṡt = −Rt , Rt ≥ 0, with S0 given.

(3)

In line with the literature (see for example Lasserre 1991, 91), it is assumed that
the extraction cost function has properties such that complete exhaustion of the
mine is uneconomic for the representative firm, formally, St > 0.

4

Refer to Lasserre (1991, 90-99) for the formal derivation of the effect of different tax schemes
within an equivalent framework to the one presented here. However, he does not derive the
impact of an increasing sales tax.
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The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is stated by
Ht = [Pt − g(St )] · Rt − τt · Pt · Rt − λt · Rt ,

(4)

with λt = µt ·ert . This is equivalent to the Hamiltonian for the problem presented by
Sinn (2008) in the context of a sales tax. That is, the static and dynamic efficiency
conditions derived in Appendix A hold [refer to equations (71) and (72)], while the
transversality condition changes. With the efficiency conditions being unchanged,
the solution for the optimal relative price path is equivalent to the one derived
within the framework of Sinn (2008) and given by
Ṗt = r · [Pt − g(St )],

(5)

for both scenarios, the business-as-usual scenario and the tax scenario (see Appendix
A for the formal derivation). However, the transversality condition for the backstop
scenario is considerably different to the one required to solve the problem considered
in Sinn (2008). In particular, the existence of the backstop technology requires that
the extraction activity ceases in finite time, exactly when the price of the fossil fuel
reaches the choke price as it is in this moment that the demand for it becomes zero.
The transversality condition is given by
λT · ST · e−rt = 0.

(6)

This is satisfied by λT = 0 because ST > 0 by assumption. Note that the maximum
constraint [refer to equation (71) in Appendix A] requires the equalization of the cash
flow to the shadow price at any point in time t. As extraction becomes increasingly
expensive and approaches the choke price, the shadow value, λt , decreases over
time. In the final period, T , the marginal profit from extraction must be zero and
equalize the shadow value. Hence, the maximum principle for T is given by (see
Levhari and Liviatan 1977, 191),
PT − g(ST ) = Pt · τT .

(7)

At T , the price net of taxes equals marginal extraction costs. The higher the tax
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rate, the lower the revenue that can be used to cover marginal extraction costs
because the choke price, Pt , remains unchanged in both scenarios. As extraction
costs are increasing in cumulative extraction, a lower g(ST ) is associated to a higher
St indicating a higher ‘cut-off grade’ (Neher 1990, 323), that is, more fossil fuels
remain unextracted. From this it follows that the higher the sales tax rate, the more
fossil fuels remain in the ground, while the tax within the framework proposed by
Sinn (2008) has no effect on total extraction. Let us now review the extraction levels.
Consider the possibility that price levels are starting from a lower level compared to
the business-as-usual scenario. With an identical growth of prices for both scenarios
as derived above, this would indicate higher initial extraction and higher extraction
levels in all subsequent periods for a longer time frame (because the price takes
longer time to rise until Pt ). This would indicate more overall extraction compared
to the business-as-usual scenario which is definitely not admissible because total
extraction is lower in the policy scenario. Also, an identical initial price level is not
admissible because it would require that the total amount of extraction is equal in
both scenarios. Instead, the optimal initial price level in the policy scenario will
be higher. In this case, the level of extraction would be lower for all periods than
under the business-as-usual scenario, the choke price would be reached earlier, and
total extraction would be reduced. Hence, the policy measure has a positive effect
on the climate because greenhouse gas emission at any time is lower than in the
baseline case and the total amount of emissions is reduced, while the same tax
scheme has no effect within the framework proposed by Sinn (2008).
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3 Endogenous Exploration and the Green Paradox
This chapter explores how the result obtained by Sinn (2008) regarding the impact
of an increasing cash flow tax changes when endogenous exploration activities
are considered. To do this, the model of Sinn (2008) is extended using the exploration process that is presented in the exploration-extraction models of Lasserre
(1991, 104-107). Within this framework, the optimal supply path with and without
an increasing cash flow tax are derived and compared in order to assess the policy’s
effectiveness for climate change mitigation.

3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions regarding the timing of extraction and exploration activities as
well as the exploration process are based on the contribution of Lasserre (1991, 105).
Consider a representative competitive fossil fuel firm that undertakes costly exploration activities to accumulate a stock of fossil fuels in a first phase. The duration
of the exploration phase is optimally chosen by the firm, as well as the size of
exploration expenditure in each period. Extraction starts as soon as the exploration
process is over. The beginning of the extraction activity can be fixed at the date
t = 0 without any loss of generality. Cumulative exploration expenses can be
expressed by C(S0 ) with S0 being the total amount of fossil fuels discovered during
the exploration period. It is intuitive that the total amount discovered is denominated as S0 as it represents the total extractable amount of fossil fuels available at
t = 0. According to Lasserre (ibid.), total discovery costs can be expressed by
Z

0

e−rt c(s−t , S−t ) dt

C(S0 ) = min

(8)

−Tx

subject to
Ṡ−t = s−t .

(9)

Note that the subscripts refer to time periods. The time −Tx denotes the initial
period of the exploration process with −Tx < 0. At the starting point, there are
no discoveries given that S−Tx = 0. With no initial resource allocation, the firm
invests at any time an amount of c(s−t , S−t ) to build up a natural capital stock.
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The amount invested in the natural capital at each point in time must increase
with the interest rate to take account of an alternative investment strategy, namely
investments in the capital market. Discovery costs in any period increase with both
the amount of discoveries, s−t , and the total amount of discoveries made in previous
periods, S−t . This reflects the standard assumption of the exploration literature
that marginal discoveries at any time decrease with the level of exploratory effort
(measured by the number of wells drilled or the drilling footage of depths) and
cumulative discoveries from previous times (refer to Pindyck 1978, 844). From this
it follows that C(S0 ) is convex and rising. The firm minimizes the discovery costs
to obtain the initial amount of fossil fuels, S0 , and due to equation (8) it is assumed
that these costs can be captured by the following function
C(S0 ) = β · S 0 α

(10)

with α > 1, and β > 0.
Extraction activities start as soon as the exploration process is terminated. The
optimal extraction decisions within this model depend on assumptions in line with
the framework proposed by Sinn (2008). However, Sinn’s approach is simplified by
the removal of extraction costs. Also, a stock dependent extraction cost function
with the properties assumed in Sinn (2008) might be misspecified according to
Livernois and Uhler (1987), Livernois (1987), and Swierzbinski and Mendelsohn
(1989) if it is used in extraction models where the size of the resource stock depends
on discoveries5 . All other assumptions remain valid. That is, the extraction amount
at time t is denoted by Rt . The firm can sell a unit of fossil fuel for the competitive
price Pt that leads at each point in time to a market equilibrium. Demand for fossil
t
· Pt
fuels is given by D(Pt ) with D0 (Pt ) < 0. The elasticity of demand, (Rt ) = ∂R
∂Pt Rt
is bounded from above as Rt goes to zero. This reflects the assumption that there
5

Livernois and Uhler (1987, 195/196) point out that in these models convex and decreasing stock
dependent cost function looses its validity if new discoveries do not have characteristics that
lower extraction costs. For example, it does not capture extraction costs if deposits that can be
depleted when lower extraction costs tend to be found first. In this case the employment of such
a cost function leads to the wrong conclusion that any increase of the resource base decreases
extraction costs.
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exists no backstop technology and as such demand is always positive for infinite
high prices (Sinn 2008, 374). To conduct the analysis below in a simpler manner, at
this point the properties of demand are further specified by introducing a specific
demand function that reflects that the elasticity of demand is constant for any Rt
and given by
D(Pt ) = P t −γ ,
(11)
with γ > 0, [refer to Dasgupta and Heal (1979, 161)] who employed this demand
function to express fossil fuel demand in a simple Hotelling framework). The property of the market demand leads to an optimal time horizon for extraction that
is equal to infinity. An increasing cash flow tax is imposed with a factor given by
θt = θ0 · eθ̂t with θ̂ < 0. There exists a limited amount of fossil fuels in the ground
representing the real world physical finiteness of fossil fuel resources. However, its
complete discovery is assumed to not be economically profitable.
In an extended profit maximizing problem the firm selects the optimal investment
in exploration in an initial phase and, in a second phase, its optimal extraction
plan, so that total discounted profits from extraction (net of eventual taxes minus
cumulative expenditures in exploration) are maximized. Formally this is shown as,
Z

∞

max

Pt · Rt · θt · e−rt dt − C(S0 ),

(12)

0

s.t.
Ṡt = −Rt with Rt ≥ 0, S0 endogenous

(13)

and
C(S0 ) as defined by equation (8).
The impact of an increasing cash flow tax on the emission path in Sinn (2008) is
clear-cut. Recall that an increasing cash flow tax implied a higher marginal profit
loss in discounted value terms the farer the extraction occurs in the future. In
response, the firm reallocated some of the extraction activity from the farer future
to the present and nearer future. Together with the assumption that greenhouse
gas emissions are proportional to fossil fuel extraction, Sinn (2008) concluded that
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such a policy arrangement accelerates the accumulation of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere and worsens the climate change problem. Within the explorationextraction framework presented in this section, however, the overall impact of
an increasing cash flow tax on the climate is not clear because the tax exerts
two countervailing effects on fossil fuel supply. First, it modifies the temporal
distribution of extraction by making it more profitable to extract the fossil fuel
stock faster. Second, it reduces the total amount extracted because exploration
incentives are lowered. The results of section 3.2.1 will show that these effects may
lead (1) to an extraction path with higher initial extraction, or (2) a lower initial
extraction level compared to the business-as-usual scenario. Following Gerlagh
(2011, 82), an extraction path as described in (1) establishes the conditions for a
weak Green Paradox. As already stated in chapter 2.2 above, a weak Green Paradox
captures the short term impact of the tax on extraction decisions and the climate.
Denote the extraction amount in the business-as-usual scenario and tax scenario
respectively as Rtbau and Rttax at t.
Definition 3.1 A weak Green Paradox arises when the implementation of an
increasing cash flow tax augments current and near term extraction compared to
what would have been optimal with no tax, formally, if R0tax > R0bau .
The extraction scenario described in (2) implies that the increasing cash flow
tax has a positive impact on the climate because extraction levels are lower at
any point in time compared to the business-as-usual scenario. In the opposite, an
optimal extraction path with an initially higher extraction level compared to the
business-as-usual scenario (1) does not have a clear impact on the climate in the
long run. It is possible that the negative impact on the climate due to higher early
emissions are offset by the reduction in total emissions. The long term effect on
the climate is captured by the concept of the strong Green Paradox. Assume that
greenhouse gas emissions are proportional to the amount of fossil fuel extracted.
Climate change damages are captured through a shadow price on emissions, χt
with χt = χ0 · eχ̂t reflecting an increasing shadow price over time. This assumption
relies on the expectation that the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere
increases over time and this leads to increasing marginal damages from emissions.
The net present value at t = 0 of climate change damages is given according to
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Gerlagh (ibid., 87) by
Z

∞

Γ=

e−δt · χt · Rt dt.

(14)

0

In line with Sinn’s Green Paradox discussion, an important assumption Gerlagh
(ibid.) implements is that early extraction (emissions) cause higher net present
value damages than delayed emissions, thus e−δt χt decreases over time. That is,
marginal damage from extraction increases by a lower amount than the discount
rate such that χ̂ < δ.
Definition 3.2 A strong Green Paradox arises if an increasing cash flow tax leads
to higher cumulative net present value climate damages due to fossil fuel extraction
than without a tax, formally, if Γtax > Γbau .
Note that a strong Green Paradox represents the issue raised by Sinn (2008). It
captures the overall effect of a climate policy and is manifested in the case where the
policy worsens the climate change problem. The concept of the weak Green Paradox
captures the short-term effect of a climate measure. It arises when a climate policy
leads to an initial increase of emissions. The policy may seem paradoxical in this
sense, however, it does not necessarily lead to a strong Green Paradox or an overall
contradiction of the policy intention.

3.2 Derivation of the results
This section derives first the optimal supply paths for the business-as-usual and
policy scenario. Subsequentally, the conditions for the appearance of a weak and a
strong Green Paradox are obtained.
3.2.1 The optimal supply decision
The differences in the optimal supply paths are crucial to assess the impact of an
increasing cash flow tax on the climate and to further compare the result to the
one obtained by for the equivalent scenario. The differences in the extraction levels
are determined by three factors. First, by the total amount of fossil fuels that are
extracted over the time horizon, second, the temporal distribution of extraction
activities and, ultimately, the optimal time frame of extractive activities (Hotelling
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1931, 283/284). While the optimal extraction horizon is infinity, the remaining two
determinants are derived in the following.
1st step: Optimal temporal distribution
The optimal temporal distribution captures the relative distribution of extraction
amounts of a given stock over the time horizon of extraction. The temporal
distribution is optimal if the fossil fuel firm cannot increase its total discounted
profit by reallocating extraction amounts from one period to another. The optimal
rule for the firm is denominated according to Hotelling (ibid.) and states that the
marginal profit of extraction is equal in each period. In the following, the conditions
for the optimal relative distributions of extraction amounts are determined for the
two scenarios. To do this, the discounted value Hamiltonian function is formulated,
Ht = Pt · Rt · θt − λt · Rt .

(15)

The necessary conditions are given by the maximum principle,
Pt · θ t = λ t

(16)

λ̇t = r · λt .

(17)

limt→∞ St · λt ert = 0.

(18)

the dynamic constraint,

and the transversality condition,

The necessary conditions for the business-as-usual scenario are given by setting
θt = 1 in equation (16). The transversality condition together with the dynamic
constraint formally confirm what we implicitly assumed beforehand; that it is optimal to completely exploit the initially available fossil fuel stock over time in both
scenarios. Note that the dynamic constraint for both scenarios display a shadow
value that is increasing over time with the interest rate. When time approaches
infinity, the shadow value gets infinitely high such that the transversality condition
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is only satisfied if the extractable stock in the final period becomes zero. Hence, the
initial fossil fuel stock available is equal to the total amount extracted, formally,
R∞
S0 = 0 Rt dt.
Differentiating the maximum principle (16) by time, equalizing it to the dynamic
constraint (17) (applying the maximum principle to express λt ), allows for the
derivation of the optimal price path in the business-as-usual scenario given by the
Hotelling condition,
bau
Ṗt = r · Ptbau ,
(19)
and in the policy scenario,
Ṗt

tax

= (r − θ̂) · Pttax .

(20)

It clearly follows that the growth rate of the price is greater in the policy scenario
because (r − θ̂) > r. This in turn leads to a steeper extraction path via the price
mechanism. For given initial fossil fuel stocks, S0bau and S0tax , this indicates that
the firm extracts a higher fraction of the respective initial fossil fuel stock in the
policy scenario in the near future compared to the fraction that is optimal in the
business-as-usual scenario. This is intuitive as a notable growth rate of the tax
indicates a higher tax burden in the farer future compared to the present and nearer
future such that it is optimal for the firm to reallocate extraction activities to earlier
periods. The firm compensates for higher profit loss in the future by extracting more
in earlier periods. This increases the level of profit in these periods and decreases the
level in the farer future periods until (20) is satisfied. However, this only describes
the temporal distribution of the initially available fossil fuel stock. Because the
tax decreases optimal investment in exploration activity and hence S0tax < S0bau , it
is not yet clear how the differences in the temporal distribution affects absolute
extraction levels. This will be clarified in the 3rd step. Using equations (19) and
(20) provide the respective price levels at t as a function of the respective initial
price levels,
Ptbau = P0bau · ert .
(21)
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Pttax = P0tax · e(r−θ̂)t ,

(22)

In the next step, the optimal relative extraction paths that correspond to these
price paths are derived.
2nd step: Derivation of the optimal relative extraction paths
At any point in time, the fossil fuel market is in equilibrium following from the
assumption that the economy is competitive. This requires that
Rt = D(Pt ) = Pt−γ

t ∈ [0; ∞].

(23)

Inserting here equations (21) and (22) yield the optimal extraction path as a
function of the initial price levels,
Rtbau = P bau
0

−γ

· eγrt .

(24)

· eγ(r−θ̂)t ,

(25)

and
Rttax = P tax
0

−γ

The rate of extracting the fossil fuel resource in the policy scenario falls at a higher
constant percentage rate, γ · (r − θ̂), compared to the business-as-usual scenario,
γ · r,
˙ = −γ · r · Rbau .
Rtbau
(26)
t
˙ = −γ · (r − θ̂) · Rtax
Rttax
t

(27)

As stated above, it is optimal for the firm to completely extract the extractable
resource stock, S0 , over an infinite time horizon in both scenarios. Applying (23),
this is satisfied if
Z ∞
−γ
P bau
dt = S0bau
(28)
t
0

and

Z

∞

P tax
t

−γ

dt = S0tax .

(29)

0
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Inserting (22) and (21) respectively in these stock constraints allows the solution
of P0tax and P0bau :
P0bau



1
=
γ · r · S0bau

 γ1

and
"
P0tax =

1

(30)
# γ1

γ · (r − θ̂) · S0tax

(31)

According to the demand function this yields optimal initial extraction levels of
R0bau = γ · r · S0bau .

(32)

R0tax = γ · (r − θ̂) · S0tax

(33)

and

Recall from definition 3.1 that a weak Green Paradox is manifested if initial extraction is higher in the policy scenario than in the business-as-usual scenario, that is,
if R0tax > R0bau . The result obtained here indicates that the higher the growth rate
of the tax, θ̂, the more likely the appearance of a weak Green Paradox. However, θ̂
might also impact the optimal exploration decision and hence the total amount of
fossil fuels extractable as well as the overall impact on initial extraction amounts
cannot be assessed at this stage.
According to the optimal price paths stated in (22) and (21), the price paths as a
function of the initial level can be derived. The corresponding extraction amounts
for these price paths are obtained via the demand function and are given by
Rtbau =

γ · r · S0bau
.
eγrt

(34)

and
γ · (r − θ̂) · S0tax
=
(35)
eγ(r−θ̂)t
To shed further light on the initial extraction level and the complete extraction
path, the optimal fossil fuel stock for both scenarios are derived in the following.
Rttax
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3rd step: Optimal exploratory decision
Consider first the optimal level of exploratory activity in the business-as-usual
scenario. According to Lasserre (1991, 106), the firm’s optimal investment in
exploration must satisfy the following transversality condition at t = 0,
C 0 (S 0 bau ) = λbau
= P0bau .
0

(36)

The transversality condition requires that at t = 0 the cost of exploring a marginal
unit of fossil fuel, given by C 0 (S0bau ), must be equal to its additional benefit that is
measured by its shadow value, λbau
(both expressed in discounted value terms). This
0
bau
is intuitive as λ0 measures the value of a unit of resource in situ at the beginning
of period 0 that arises if the fossil fuel owners extracts its stock optimally (Perman
et al. 2003, 499). In effect, the shadow value for any t measures the sensitivity
of the total discounted maximum profit to the fossil fuel resource stock, that is,
to which extent a marginal unit of fossil fuel in the ground augment the total
profit at t (Chiang 1992, 206). How is the optimal exploration decision impacted
by the implementation of an increasing cash flow tax? The transversality condition
required in the policy scenario yields insight:
tax
C 0 (S0tax ) = λtax
· θ0 .
0 = P0

(37)

The implementation of an increasing cash flow tax leads to lower investments in
exploration and hence to a lower total amount of fossil fuels discovered. However,
the effect on the initial price level is unclear. This will be shown in the following,
starting with the decrease in the optimal exploration activity.
Note that the tax does not affect the exploration cost function; the left-hand side
of (37) remains unaffected. The right hand side is impacted by the cash flow tax
twofold due to a change of the initial optimal price and the appearance of the tax
factor θ0 . Assume the firm would stick to the exploration decision that is optimal
under business-as-usual conditions, that is, C 0 (S0tax ) = C 0 (S0bau ), which implies
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the same initial amount of fossil fuels available. In turn, the optimal initial price
would be lower in the policy scenario [to see this compare equations (30) and (31)]
thereby decreasing the initial shadow value. The latter is further diminished by
a fraction corresponding to the initial tax rate of the initial price. This makes it
clear that λtax
< λbau
such that maintaining the same exploratory effort in the
0
0
policy scenario does not satisfy the transversality condition. It must follow that
the optimal exploratory investment is diminished in the policy scenario, as is the
total extractable fossil fuel stock as a lower C 0 (S0 ) is linked to a lower level of S0 .
3.2.2 Conditions for a weak Green Paradox
Recall from definition 3.1 that a weak Green Paradox captures the short term
effect of an increasing cash flow tax. It arises when initial emissions from fossil
fuel extraction are higher in the policy scenario compared to the business-as-usual
scenario, formally, if R0tax > R0bau . Inserting the expressions obtained in (33) and
(32) yield
(r − θ̂) · S0tax > r · S0bau .
(38)
While r and θ̂ are constants, the respective initial reserve levels are endogenous
depending on the optimal investment in exploration and are derived in the following.
Inserting the optimal initial price levels expressed in (31) and (30) into the respective
condition for optimal exploration decisions and rearranging obtains
S0bau =

1
γ · r · C 0 (S0bau )γ

and
S0tax =

θ0γ
γ · (r − θ̂) · C 0 (S0tax )γ

(39)

(40)

The expression for the optimal exploration cost function can be replaced with
the first derivation of the exploration cost function specified in (10), that is,
C 0 (S0 ) = α · β · S 0 α−1 . This yields an expression for the optimal fossil fuel stock in
both scenarios which depends on the constants:
S0bau


=

1
γ · r · (αβ)γ

1
 γ(α−1)+1

(41)
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S0tax =

1
! γ(α−1)+1

θ0γ

.

γ · (r − θ̂) · (αβ)γ

(42)

Conditions (38), (41) and (42) reveal the effect of the components of the tax schemes
in terms of generating a weak Green Paradox. That is, the higher θ0 , the higher
the optimal fossil fuel stock in the policy scenario and hence the higher the initial
extraction level. However, the growth rate of the tax causes two countervailing
impacts. On the one hand, (38) shows clearly that for a higher θ̂, ceteris paribus,
the initial amount of fossil fuels decreases. On the other hand, the initial extraction
level is defined by (42). It becomes clear that a higher θ̂ decreases the initial
extraction stock and hence initial extraction levels rise [refer to (38)]. Note also
that equations (41) and (42) prove formally what has been said beforehand, that
is, that the optimal initial fossil fuel stock in the policy scenario is lower compared
to the business-as-usual scenario.
Finally, inserting equations (41) and (42) in equation (38) provides the condition
for a weak Green Paradox:
θ0 >

θ̂
1−
r

!1−α
.

(43)

The condition states that the short term effect on the climate is detrimental with
increased emissions in early periods if the initial tax factor is smaller than (1− θ̂r )1−α .
This condition depicts clearly the drivers of a weak Green Paradox. The lower the
initial tax rate (a high θ0 ) and the higher the growth rate of the cash flow tax, θ̂,
the more probable a weak Green Paradox. Equivalently, an increase of θ0 , ceteris
paribus, increases the left hand side of (43) and hence makes a weak Green Paradox
more probable. The same effects holds for an increase of the growth rate of the tax,
ceteris paribus. The following two graphs emphasize the role of the two components
of the tax scheme in generating a weak Green Paradox. Consider figure 2. It depicts
the two possible effects of an increasing cash flow tax associated to a high and
a low growth rate of the tax, θ̂. It can be shown, that the low growth rate (tax
scenario I) does not lead to a weak Green Paradox, while the high growth rate (tax
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scenario II), ceteris paribus, generates a weak Green Paradox. On the x-axis, the
amount of fossil fuels discovered, S0 , is plotted. The y-axis shows possible courses
for C 0 (S0 ), P0 and λ0 as functions of S0 for both scenarios. The first decreasing
line from above depicts the optimal price and shadow value paths depending on
the initial fossil fuel stock, S0 , in the business-as-usual scenario. The two dotted
lines below graph the shadow values associated to a low θ̂ and a high θ̂ respectively,
while the two remaining lines depict the associated initial prices for the two policy
scenarios. The only increasing line represents marginal exploration costs C 0 (S0 ).

Figure 2: The impact of the growth rate
Consider that under business-as-usual assumptions, the optimal initial fossil fuel
stock, S0bau , is obtained by the value on the x-axis with which the line that depicts
the initial shadow value as a function of S0 intersects with the exploration cost line.
This satisfies the optimal exploration condition stated in equation (36). Because the
initial price path is equal to the shadow value path, the value on the y-axis states
the respective optimal initial price associated to the optimal S0bau . It is denominated
as Pbau in the diagram. The optimal initial values for the two tax scenarios are
obtained in an equivalent manner. It is given by the value on the x axis for which the
respective shadow values for both scenarios intersect the exploration cost function.
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It can be clearly seen that the imposition of the increasing cash flow tax leads to a
decline in the optimal initial fossil fuel stock. The initial price associated to the
two tax scenarios are given by the respective values on the y-axis of the respective
price curves for the respective optimal initial fossil fuel stock, denoted in figure 2
as StaxI and StaxII .
Also, the probability of a weak Green Paradox rises the higher the initial tax factor.
Recall that a high initial tax factor corresponds to a low initial tax burden (and
hence also to a lower level of absolute tax burden in all subsequent periods). Graph
3 shows two tax scenarios where a high θ0 (tax scenario I) lead to a weak Green
Paradox, whereas a low θ0 (tax scenario II), ceteris paribus, does not. The intuition
is that a low level of θ0 does significantly reduce S0bau and as such extraction levels
at all times have to decrease (associated to an increase in the price level) in order
to satisfy the resource constraint. The first decreasing line from above again depicts
the optimal price and initial shadow value path in the business-as-usual scenario.

Figure 3: The impact of the initial tax rate
Under equation (43) there is no value for the growth rate of the tax that excludes

31

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper664

32

Österle: Fossil Fuel Extraction and Climate Policy: A Review of the G

the possibility of the tax scheme generating a weak Green Paradox. This becomes
clear because for any θ̂ > 0, the right hand side of (43) never becomes greater than
1. However, if the government chooses a value of θ0 between 0 and 1 for which the
left hand side of (43) is greater than the right hand side, the appearance of a weak
Green Paradox is avoided. From this it follows that there is no admissible value
for the initial tax rate, θ0 , that excludes the possibility of a weak Green Paradox
because for any value it assumes, there are values for θ̂ that generate a weak Green
Paradox.
Finally, the exploration cost function enters the condition for a weak Green Paradox
and as such there are a few words to say. A higher α is associated to greater marginal
exploration costs in absolute values. This leads to a smaller relative decrease of
total discoveries for a given tax scheme (that in turn leads to an absolute decrease
in the shadow value) compared to what would have been respectively optimal in
the business-as-usual scenario. Obviously, the lower the relative decrease in the
fossil fuel stock, the lower the absolute increase in the price level. A lower increase
in the price level is associated to a lower decrease of extraction levels, hence making
a weak Green Paradox more probable.
3.2.3 Conditions for a strong Green Paradox
This section derives the formal conditions under which an increasing cash flow
tax produces a strong Green Paradox. According to definition 3.2, this occurs if
the implementation of an increasing cash flow tax leads to higher climate change
damage compared to the business-as-usual scenario, formally given by Γtax > Γbau .
To solve the climate damage function for both scenarios, it is necessary to derive
the complete extraction paths. Replacing S0bau and S0tax in (35) and (34) with the
functions given in (41) and (42) obtain
Rtbau = (γ · r)


1−

1
1)
γ(α−1+ γ



· (α · β)


−

1
1)
(α−1+ γ



· e−γrt

(44)
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and,


Rttax = [γ · (r − θ̂)]

1
1−
1)
γ(α−1+ γ





· (α · β)

1
−
1)
(α−1+ γ





· e−γ(r−θ̂)t · θ0

1
1
α−1+ γ



(45)

Inserting these equations into the net present value of climate change damages
expressed in (14), yield climate damages of


Γbau

1
χ0 · (γ · r)
=
δ − χ̂ + γr

1−

1
1)
γ(α−1+ γ




−

· (α · β)

1
1)
(α−1+ γ



(46)

and,
Γtax =


1−

1
δ − χ̂ + γ(r − θ̂)

· χ0 · [γ · (r − θ̂)]

1
1)
γ(α−1+ γ





· (α · β)

1
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· θ0

1
1
α−1+ γ



(47)
A strong Green Paradox occurs when net climate damages in the policy scenario
[equation (47)] are greater than climate net damages arising in the business-as-usual
scenario [equation (46)]. This occurs, if

θ0 >

γ · θ̂
1−
δ − χ̂ + γr

!(α−1+ γ1 )

θ̂
1−
r

!1−α
(48)

An increasing cash flow tax is more likely to generate a strong Green Paradox, the
lower the initial tax burden (the higher θ0 ) with given values of θ̂, r, δ, γ, χ̂ and α.
This is intuitive as for a given growth rate of the tax, the temporal distribution of
extraction remains the same, but a lower initial tax level (and hence a lower tax
level in all subsequent periods) assures a higher level of investments in exploratory
activities and hence a higher total amount of extractable fossil fuels. In turn, the
greater the fossil fuel stock, the higher the extraction levels at any time t and hence
the more emissions enter the atmosphere at any time.
The level of the growth rate of the tax has an ambiguous impact on the climate.
A very low growth rate lead to a small temporal redistribution such that a strong
Green Paradox is not generated. However, if the growth rate is too high, the level
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of the tax increases significantly and leads to a reduction of expected profits from
extraction such that the investments in exploration activities shrink significantly.
In particular, the higher the growth rate the higher the tax rates at any point in
time for a given initial tax rate and hence the lower the initial shadow value of the
fossil fuels. The reduction of the total amount of extraction may be sufficiently
high to offset the increase in initial extraction generated by a high growth rate. In
conclusion, there is a specific range of growth rates that generate a strong Green
Paradox, ceteris paribus. A very tiny growth rate, as well as a very high growth rate
do not lead to a strong Green Paradox. Also, the lower the initial tax burden, the
more probable that a high growth rate does not generate a strong Green Paradox
because the total tax burden remains high such that total extraction decreases
significantly.
The right hand side of (48) increases in δ which reflects the sensitivity of the climate
damage to emissions in early periods. A higher δ, ceteris paribus, leads to a smaller
value on the right hand side and hence makes a strong Green Paradox more probable.
Recall from the climate change damage function stated in (14) that the higher δ, the
greater the climate damage associated to the use of a unit of fossil fuel in early periods compared to later periods. This implies that a given tax scheme that decreases
total extraction but causes faster extraction, in early periods is more harmful to
the climate, due to the higher δ and hence a strong Green Paradox is more probable.
The right hand term of (48) decreases with χ̂ which reflects the strength of the
globe’s absorptive capacity. The higher the absorptive capacity, the lower the
increase in marginal damages from emissions in later periods due to a lower greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere (thereby reducing marginal damages).
A strong Green Paradox is more probable the lower the value of χ̂. To show that,
consider the consequences of the highest possible value for it, with χ̂ approaching δ
(recall that δ > χ̂ by assumption). This would would imply that the climate damage
e−δ t · eχ̂t · χ̂0 of a unit of fossil fuels, in present value terms remains almost constant
over time. In this case, (when χ̂ is at is largest possible value) a significant increase
in initial extraction due to the tax scheme hardly impacts climate change damages.
Instead, the decrease in total extraction caused by the tax leads to a decrease in
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climate change damages. In this case it can be stated that any increasing cash flow
tax actually generates environmental benefits. This leads to the general conclusion
that the higher χ̂, the smaller the increase in climate damages associated to higher
initial extraction, hence a strong Green Paradox becomes less probable. On the
other hand, a small χ̂ has the same effect as a higher δ because it means that
the climate damage of a unit of fossil fuels is decreasing over time, making initial
extraction more harmful for the climate relative to later extraction.
The exploration cost function also enters the condition for the strong Green Paradox.
The higher the value of α, the smaller is the left hand side of equation (48), making
a strong Green Paradox more possible. As already discussed in the section where
the condition for a weak Green Paradox has been derived, a high α is associated
to an exploration cost function with high marginal exploration costs. With higher
values of α, any given decrease in the optimal marginal exploration cost due to the
implementation of a tax results in a smaller decrease in the absolute amount of
fossil fuel discovered. Hence, total discoveries are lowered, but by a smaller fraction.
This results in a lower reduction in climate change damages under the tax scenario
due to smaller decreases in exploration and hence makes a strong Green Paradox
more probable.

3.3 Results
The results obtained in section 3. 2 show that an increasing cash flow tax tends to
reduce climate damages when exploration is modelled endogenously. This weakens
the result obtained by Sinn (2008) which is derived in a similar framework without
exploration and finds that an increasing cash flow tax leads to a Green Paradox
and hence worsens climate change.
The framework shows that if costly exploratory activities are considered, the size
of the initial fossil fuel stock is endogenous and depends on the expectation of
the profit from extraction activities. Any increasing tax imposed on extraction
profits reduces the cash flow obtained by a given amount of fossil fuels. In response,
firms will reduce exploratory activities, thereby lowering the size of the initial
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stock available. This is clear because the optimal exploration decision requires
that marginal expenses for exploration equal the marginal revenue obtained for
it. Because any cash flow tax decreases the latter, the optimality condition for
exploratory activities is no longer satisfied if the firms stick with the investment
decision previously determined to the tax announcement. The firms then revise
their exploration decision by decreasing investments in exploratory activities. This
is the crucial element for the change in the result obtained compared to Sinn
(2008). In Sinn (2008), firms are endowed with the fossil fuel resource and hence an
increasing cash flow tax does not impact the total amount extracted. An increasing
cash flow tax within the framework of Sinn (2008) exerts a change in the optimal
timing of extraction decisions, while the volume is not modified. Since the total
amount of fossil fuels extracted does not change, and it is more profitable to extract
in periods in the near future, the firms will extract their stock at a faster rate.
Under an exploration-extraction framework, the imposition of a tax has two effects;
a reduction in the total amount extracted and a change in the temporal distribution
of extraction. The impact of the tax on the temporal distribution and the volume
has two countervailing consequences for the effectiveness of the tax. While the tax
results in the extraction of a higher fraction of the fossil fuel stock in the near term
future compared to the no tax scenario, the volume effect leads to a decrease in
overall extraction. Hence, the absolute extraction levels are ambiguous and depend
on the formulation of the exact tax scheme.
Figure 4 shows the possible optimal extraction paths for the business-as-usual
scenario in the framework presented in Sinn (2008) as well as in this chapter,
depicted by the unbroken line. They are identical because it is assumed that the
firm chooses to explore in the extraction-exploration framework an optimal initial
fossil fuel stock that equals the fossil fuel stock given in Sinn (2008). The dotted
line depicts the extraction path that may arise under the assumptions made by
Sinn (2008) when an increasing cash flow tax is implemented. The dashed line
graphs the optimal extraction path that may arise due to the same policy measure
within the framework presented in this chapter.
Initially, in both frameworks, supply increases (and hence, a weak Green Paradox
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Figure 4: Optimal extraction programs
is manifested). However, the increase induced under the assumptions made by
Sinn (2008) is higher than in the extraction-exploration scenario where the stock is
endogenous. At some point in time, extraction levels fall under the business-as-usual
paths in both frameworks. The time point with which this occurs is earlier in the
scenario with an endogenous fossil fuel stock. The increase of initial extraction
levels clearly lead to a Green Paradox in the framework of Sinn (2008) because total
extraction are not changed. The initial increase in extraction in the alternative
scenario leads to a negative short term effect on the climate due to higher initial
emissions and thus creates a weak Green Paradox. However, due to the decrease
in overall extraction, the total impact on the climate is not clear. A strong Green
Paradox will depend on the specific tax scheme [θ0 , θ̂], on the sensitivity of climate
damage to emissions in early periods, δ, the relative strength of the absorptive
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capacity, χ̂, exploration cost, α [as represented in (47)].
It can be concluded that to guarantee the effectiveness of an increasing cash flow
tax it is important to choose the ’right’ initial level and growth rate of the tax. In
fact, by deriving the condition for a strong Green Paradox [refer to equation (48)],
it has been shown that the higher the initial tax rate, the higher the probability
that climate damages are reduced by implementing this specific tax scheme. Also, a
tax with a very low and very high growth rate is with a higher probability effective
for climate change issues. Equation (48) further shows that for specific levels of the
growth rate, a strong Green Paradox can be excluded independently of the initial
tax rate when the right hand side of the term becomes greater than 1 because, by
definition, the left hand side can only assume a value smaller than 1.

3.4 Discussion
By including costly exploration activity in the model of Sinn (2008), it has been
shown that an increasing cash flow tax will quite likely be an effective instrument
to control global warming. It induces the economic actors to use less fossil fuels
over the whole time horizon and hence reduce total emissions. If the reduction in
emissions is high enough to outweigh the emissions from faster extraction induced
by an increase in the tax over time, a positive impact on the climate is achieved.
This requires a specific tax scheme to generate desirable results in terms of climate
change mitigation. In particular, the higher the initial tax rate and the closer the
growth rate to its two extremes (given by a very low and a very high rate), the more
probable that climate damages will be reduced compared to the business-as-usual
extraction path.
The result can be generalized to other tax schemes. In fact, the implementation of
a sales tax is also less likely to generate a strong Green Paradox. This result can be
drawn by the discussion from Heaps and Helliwell (1985, 454/455). In a framework
similar to the one presented in this chapter, but with extraction costs that depend
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on the rate of extraction, the implementation of a tax on output6 leads to a positive
effect on the climate if it is increasing with the interest rate, while the same tax
scheme lead to no effect on the climate in the framework proposed in Sinn (2008).
In fact, a severance tax that increases with the interest rate lead to an extraction
path where extraction is lower at each point in time. This is true because the total
amount of fossil fuels extracted is reduced, while the temporal distribution does not
change. From this it becomes clear that a sales tax with a growth rate that is greater
than the interest rate does not necessarily lead to a strong Green Paradox because
the faster extraction activity might be overweighed by the total emission reductions.
The result obtained in this chapter can be applied to assess the climate approach of
Kyoto countries. Their efforts are aimed at shrinking fossil fuel demand and thereby
lowering the expected profit from extraction. This leads to a decrease in the value
of any mining project, and as such, the incentive to invest in these projects are
decreased. Through the reduction of total emissions, a Kyoto consistent approach
is expected to have a positive effect on the climate in the longterm.
The exploration cost function described above can also capture the huge investments necessary for utilising the newly discovered fossil fuel stock after successful
exploration. This becomes clear from Bohi and Toman’s (1983, 928) description of
the real world supply process that necessitates both, exploration and development
expenditures for a single stock before any extraction process can start. Development
of the resource includes gaining access to the resource through sinking mine shafts
or drilling wells and installing surface equipment for extraction.
There are two main drawbacks regarding the approach utilised in this paper to
incorporate exploration within the model presented by Sinn (2008). First, real
world facts suggest that extraction and exploration activities occur simultaneously.
Second, discoveries are modelled as depending on a continuous exploration cost
function which is associated to resource discoveries being the outcome of a continu-

6

A tax on output is equivalent to a tax on the value of the output as both lead to profits yield by
the product of the price, amount of fossil fuels extracted and the tax rate.
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ous variable, exploration activities. This is not realistic as in reality exploration
costs are sunk and huge investment amounts are necessary to explore a stock. The
interesting question is how the results obtained change when these two elements are
considered. It is argued that the inclusion of these assumptions would not change
the basic result. An increasing cash flow tax would decrease the total amount
extracted and change the temporal distribution in a similar way as derived above.
Beside the shortcomings of the framework mentioned, it is able to capture an important feature of the fossil fuel supply process; the necessity to invest capital to build
up a fossil fuel stock from which to extract. The tax analyzed within this framework
is imposed on the profit from extraction and while in line with the assumption of
Sinn (2008), it is not a typically prescribed climate policy measure. However, it is
argued that the framework would obtain similar results for an increasing sales tax
or an emission tax.
Further insight is given by a recent paper by Venables (2011, 21/22). He extends
a Hotelling model with no backstop technology to incorporate costly exploration
and development activities. In particular, firms can add new discoveries to their
initial fossil fuel stock by opening new fields. The firm has to decide how much to
extract at any point in time and when to open new fields. The size of the field is
known and capital cost in per unit resource stock to open a new field differ across
fields. Venables (ibid., 17) shows that a permanent decrease in demand leads to
a smaller amount of field openings and a decrease in extraction activities at all
points in time compared to what would have been optimal without the decrease.
Applying his result obtained to the Green Paradox discussion, it can be stated
that a demand decrease within the framework does not lead to a Green Paradox,
instead it has clearly a positive impact for climate issues as it reduces emissions at
any point in time below the baseline level.
From the analysis undertaken in chapter 3, there are two important conclusions for
climate policy design. First, while an increasing cash flow tax may be effective for
climate change issues, it is important to select the most appropriate tax scheme.
Second, when policy-makers announce the tax scheme, they need to be credible
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because investment in exploration activities depend on the expected price path
of the fossil fuels. If policy-makers are not credible when announcing the tax, the
exploratory activity may be not impacted and hence overall extraction may not
decrease.

4 Conclusion
Considerable efforts have been undertaken to formulate policy to tackle climate
change on a national and international level. Recently, Hans-Werner Sinn (2008, 388)
noted that the standard climate policy approach – the implementation of measures aimed at reducing carbon demand (such as taxes on fuels and subsidies for
low-carbon and high-efficient technologies) – may not mitigate the problem of
global warming. This result was built upon a Hotelling (1931) model of optimal
resource extraction with stock-dependent extraction costs and no backstop technology. Within this framework, Sinn (2008) analyzed different tax schemes and showed
that the imposition of an increasing cash flow tax and a sales tax which increases
by more than a specific rate leads resource owners to extract their resources faster
in order to avoid the higher tax burden in the farer future compared to the tax
burden today and the nearer future. In the light of these considerations, Sinn (2008)
regarded an effective policy measure as one that flattens the extraction path, and
leads fossil fuel owners to extract their resources at a slower pace.
The contribution of this paper is to present and discuss the Hotelling framework
with a fixed fossil fuel stock, stock-depending extraction costs and no backstop
technology presented in the contribution of Sinn (2008) and to provide two extensions of it. First, it analyzes how the existence of a backstop technology changes
the result obtained by Sinn (2008) regarding the effect of sales tax that increases
˙
t
over time by the factor (r − PPtt ) with Ṗt = ∂P
. It has been shown in section 2. 2
∂t
that the result drawn by Sinn (2008) regarding the neutrality of this specific tax
scheme significantly changes if a backstop technology exists because it loses its
neutral character. In effect, if a backstop technology is available, the policy measure
leads to a decrease in the total amount of fossil fuels extracted, while the optimal
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relative price path is not impacted. In consequence, the amount extracted is lower
at any point in time compared to the baseline scenario and hence the tax scheme
is considered as an effective instrument for climate change mitigation. This result
can applied to the implementation of any demand reducing policy measure as they
have an equivalent effect on the expected price path for fossil fuels.
Secondly, the paper then extends the model of Sinn (2008) to take into account of
the reality that firms are not ‘endowed’ with fossil fuels, but instead have to incur
costs in exploration activity before any extraction starts. The results obtained in
chapter 3 show that an increasing cash flow tax tends to reduce climate damage
when exploration is modelled endogenously. The tax leads to a temporal redistribution of extraction activities because of the increasing tax burden over time and
hence gives an incentive for the firm to extract their resources faster. However,
overall extraction is reduced because the incentive to explore is reduced following
the decrease in expected profits from extraction. Hence, the total impact on the
climate depends on the specific tax scheme and the climate damage function that
specifies the temporal extraction decisions’ impact on the climate. These findings
weaken the result obtained by Sinn (2008) who abstracts from costly exploration
and finds that an increasing cash flow tax leads to a Green Paradox and hence
worsens climate change.
To incorporate exploration, the approach of Heaps and Helliwell (1985, 452/453)
and Lasserre (1991, 104-107) is applied. Both contributions focus on the endogeneity
of the reserve base and the exploration efforts that are undertaken prior to the
extraction phase. During the exploration period of an endogenous length, the firm
invests in exploration activities to accumulate fossil fuel reserves. Subsequentally, it
selects an optimal extraction program. In this extended profit maximizing problem,
the firm must now choose in a first phase the optimal amount of investment in
exploration and, in a second phase, the optimal extraction plan in such a way as
to maximize total discounted profits from extraction (net of taxes and cumulative
expenditures in exploration). The framework shows that if costly exploratory activities are considered, the size of the initial fossil fuel stock is endogenous and
depends on the expectation of the profit from extraction activities. For the case of
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an increasing tax on extraction profits it can be shown that it reduces the cash
flow obtained for a given amount of fossil fuels. In response, firms will reduce
exploratory activities, thereby lowering the size of the initial stock available. This
is clear because the optimal exploration decision requires that marginal expenses
for exploration are equal to the marginal revenue obtained from it. As any cash
flow tax decreases the latter, the optimality condition for exploratory activities
is no longer satisfied if the firms stick with the investment decision determined
before the tax announcement. The firms then revise their exploration decision by
decreasing investments in exploratory activities. This is the crucial element for the
change in the result obtained compared to Sinn (2008) where the fossil fuel stock
is given with an increasing cash flow tax .
The result obtained within the extraction-exploration framework presented in
chapter 3 indicates that it is important to choose the most appropriate tax scheme
for an increasing cash flow tax to be effective. The cash flow tax will likely be
more effective in combating climate change, the higher the initial level of the tax
rate and the more extreme the growth rate of the tax (either higher or lower).
In summary, the effectiveness of an increasing cash flow tax depends on the specific tax scheme chosen, the sensitivity of climate damage to emissions in early
periods, the relative strength of the absorptive capacity of the environment, the existence of a backstop technology, and the exploration costs incurred before extraction.
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A Appendix
This appendix derives formally the firm’s optimal extraction decisions under different
scenarios within the framework employed by Sinn (2008) and presented in the main
text in chapter 2.1.

A.1 Assumptions
Consider a representative competitive firm which possesses a fixed and known
stock of homogeneous non-renewable resource reflecting fossil fuel energy supplies,
denoted by S0 . The firm’s objective is to maximize the discounted profit from
extracting the stock. Profits at each point in time t are obtained by extracting an
amount of fossil, Rt and selling them for the market price, Pt . The market price is
t)
determined by the market demand function R(Pt ) with ∂R(P
< 0 representing the
∂Pt
normal property of demand decreasing with the price level. The absolute value of
t
the price elasticity of demand, (Rt ) = ∂R
· RPtt , is bounded from above as Rt goes
∂Pt
to zero. This indicates that there is always a positive demand for arbitrary (infinite)
high prices, that is, R(Pt ) > 0 for all Pt ≥ 0. The fossil fuel price mechanism
generates a market equilibrium where supply equals demand, that is, R(Pt ) = Rt .
Consider that the firm is perfectly informed and the constant market interest rate
is given by r.
Extraction costs Ct = C(Rt , St ) are independent of the current rate of extraction,
Rt , thus unit (and marginal) extraction costs are constant within a given period. It
is assumed that unit extraction costs depend only on the size of the remaining stock
(the amount of resources remaining after extraction occurs at all previous points
in time). In particular, the unit cost of extraction in t is higher, the smaller the
remaining stock. Total cost of extraction in period t can hence be expressed by Ct =
g(St )·Rt with g 0 (St ) < 0. Consider that unit extraction costs are bounded from
above, that is, they approach a finite value, as St goes to zero. A real-world example
of stock-dependency determining recovery costs is provided by Krautkraemer (1998,
2069) with natural pressure within an oil field declining as an oil stock is depleted.
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The evolution of the fossil fuel resource stock over time is only dependent on resource
extraction decisions and can thus be described by the state equation Ṡt = −Rt ,
t
with Ṡt = ∂S
. For simplicity, it is assumed that fossil fuels once extracted are not
∂t
able to be stored for subsequent periods. This implies that extraction of fossil fuels
directly determines the use of fossil fuels and thus directly determines the amount
of greenhouse gases emitted via the combustion process.
Note that all functions are differentiable and well defined for nonzero values of
their arguments.
The representative competitive firm maximizes its total discounted profit by choosing an optimal extraction plan. Following Hotelling (1931, 285), it is optimal for the
representative firm to choose an extraction plan over an infinite time horizon under
the assumptions described in this section. This is attributable to the boundedness of
the demand elasticity and extraction costs as Rt and St goes to zero. The properties
of the demand function guarantees that even if the price increases to an infinite
level over time, the firm yields a profit from extraction because there is always a
demand for fossil fuels for arbitrarily high prices.
Under these assumptions, the firm’s decision in the business-as-usual scenario can
be formally expressed by:
Z

∞

Max.

[Pt − g(St )] · Rt · e−rt dt,

(49)

0

subject to the resource constraint
Ṡt = −Rt ,

(50)

Rt ≥ 0, S0 given, and limt→∞ St ≥ 0.
The latter expression represents the physical constraint given by the fact that
over the whole time horizon, the firm cannot extract more than the fixed initial
stock. This constrained dynamic decision problem can be solved by applying the
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maximum principle. The current value Hamiltonian function is given by
Ht = [Pt − g(St )] · Rt − λt · Rt ,

(51)

with λt = µt · ert representing the co-state variable for the fossil fuel stock7 .
The necessary conditions include the static efficiency condition,
∂Ht
= Pt − g(St ) − λt = 0,
∂Rt

(52)

the dynamic efficiency condition,
λ̇t = r · λt −

∂Ht
= r · λt + g 0 (St ) · Rt ,
∂St

(53)

and the transversality condition,
limt→∞ e−rt · St · λt = 0,

(54)

The co-state variable, λt denotes the firm’s marginal valuation of the fossil fuel
in situ (in the ground) at each point in time (along the optimal extraction path)
(Perman et al. 2003, 499). As noted in Chiang (1992, 206/207), it measures the
sensitivity of the total (maximum) profit to the fossil fuel resource stock, that is, a
marginal unit of resource available at the beginning of time t would increase the total
maximum profit by the amount λt . Following the representation of Krautkraemer
(1998, 2069), the shadow value λt in the framework discussed here is composed by
two elements. Formally,
rt

Z

λt = λ̂ · e −

∞

g 0 (Sτ ) · Rτ · e−r(τ −t) dτ,

(55)

t

with λ̂ = limt→∞ e−rt λt and τ ≥ t. The first term expresses the in situ value of a
marginal unit of resource in the terminal period expressed in current value terms.

7

Sinn (2008) stated the Hamiltonian for the problem in his appendix on pages 389/390 in a
general form including the various tax rates that here will be considered after deriving the
business-as-usual path.
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The second term measures the sum of the cost benefits that a marginal unit of
fossil fuel in situ brings about in the current period and also spills over into all
future periods by increasing the level of resources in the ground in these periods
and thus lowering unit extraction costs. The equation above is similar to the one
presented by Krautkraemer (ibid., 2096). In his representation he set a positive
sign in front of the integral. Here we use a negative sign to make the second part
positive (as it captures the benefits in terms of cost reductions) according to the
positivity of the shadow value. The higher the accumulated cost benefits over the
whole time horizon, the greater the value of λt ≥ 0.
A useful interpretation of the shadow value has been provided by Scott (1955, 42).
He denominated the co-state variable as user costs measuring the missed discounted
future profit and cost benefits from extracting a marginal unit of resource in the
current period. Scott (1955) emphasized that the size of the user cost depends on
the whole future time path of cost and price. It can be described as the opportunity
cost of producing in the current period instead of later and is associated to the
limited availability of fossil fuels in particular, and any exhaustible resources in
general. The shadow value λt has also been described as the scarcity rent reflecting
that the fossil fuel firm obtains a positive rent for the marginal unit extracted
in each period measured by the difference between the price and marginal costs
[refer to equation (52)] (Krautkraemer, 1998, 2066). This feature distinguishes
the production of fossil fuel substantially from the production of a normal good
which is characterized by selecting at any time a production quantity that equalizes
the market price to its marginal cost. It is exactly this characteristic of fossil fuel
production that modifies the standard effect of a tax on production behavior.
The static efficiency condition requires that the service obtainable from a resource
should be equal to the marginal value of that resource stock in situ (ibid., 484). In
the particular setting presented here, equation (52) states that, at each point in
time, the marginal profit from extraction, [Pt − g(St )], must be equal to the shadow
value of the fossil fuel, λt . Remember that the fossil fuel resource can be extracted
in the current period or a later period. If the marginal profit in the current period is
higher than its in situ value, this means that future profit prospects from extraction
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are less profitable than extracting in the current period. Hence, to maximize its
total profit, the firm should augment its current extraction level. This leads to a
higher supply in the current period and hence to a price decrease. The firm will only
stop extracting in the current period, if the price mechanism lead to a marginal
profit from extraction that is equal to the shadow value (the latter increases too
because the fossil fuel becomes scarcer in the future).
The dynamic efficiency condition given in equation (53) is best understood when
consulting Solow’s interpretation of the resource stock as a capital asset (Solow
1974, 2). The dynamic efficiency condition can be interpreted as an asset market
equilibrium. The asset market is in equilibrium, if the rate of return from investing
in the natural capital equals the rate of return of any alternative investment
strategy. In our setting, the alternative rate of return is given by the market rate of
interest, r. The return of a marginal unit of the resource asset can be decomposed
into two elements (Gaudet 2007, 1035/1036): first, the change in its value over
an infinitesimal small period, expressed by λ̇t . Second, a benefit in the form of
cost savings in the current period t attributable to the additional marginal unit
of resource in the ground. The asset market is in equilibrium when both rates of
return are equal, that is, if
r=

λ̇t g 0 (St ) · Rt
+
.
λt
λt

(56)

Consider that the dynamic constraint requires that the marginal cash flow grows
over time by less than the interest rate because of the stock depending extraction
costs (without stock depending extraction costs is is well known that it would
grow with the interest rate). If the fossil fuel firm decides between extraction today
or any other period, it needs to take into account not only the marginal profit it
obtains from selling the fossil fuel for the market price, but also the benefits from
holding the fossil fuel in the ground in terms of the cost reduction. In conclusion,
the firm is indifferent between extracting in the current period compared to any
other period when the current marginal profit equals tomorrows marginal profit
plus the value of benefits in form of extraction cost reduction.
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The transversality condition requires that the discounted value of the resource
stock is worth zero in the terminal period when extraction activities are terminated
(Neher 1990, 298). The value arises from the amount of stock remaining in the
terminal period valued by its discounted shadow price, that is, limt→∞ e−rt · λt · St .
Note that the transversality condition is satisfied when either the resource stock
is completely exhausted, or the remaining stock has a zero value (Krautkraemer
1998, 2068).

A.2 The optimal extraction path in the business-as-usual
scenario
This section shows how the optimal absolute level of extraction is derived. To
do this, in a first step the price path that corresponds to the optimal extraction
decision of the representative firm is derived. Differentiate the static efficiency
condition by time yields (under the assumption that g 00 (St ) = 0),
λ̇t = Ṗt + g 0 (St ) · Rt ,

(57)

The maximum principle requires that at each point in time, the marginal profit
equals the shadow value of the resource. Differentiating the condition by time yields
a change in both, the shadow price and also the optimal marginal profit, as they
are equal at each time. The change in the optimal marginal profit consists of a
price change and a change in marginal extraction costs. The dynamic efficiency
condition (53) requires the shadow value to change over time in a specific way,
depending on the value in the current period. As the shadow value is equal to the
marginal profit, the dynamic constraint requires the marginal profit to change with
the interest rate minus the cost benefit from a marginal unit of fossil fuels in the
ground in the current period. Hence, the change in price and extraction cost has to
satisfy the dynamic condition and leads to the optimal price path
Ṗt = r · [Pt − g(St )].

(58)

This is what in the literature is known as a variant of the well-known Hotelling rule.
Recall that the firm has to choose the optimal extraction amount for each point in
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time in order to maximize its discounted profits. The problem of optimal allocation
is due to the exhaustibility of resources; the extraction of a unit of fossil fuels
today decreases possible future profits from extraction. Based on the contribution
of Levhari and Liviatan (1977, 178/179/181), Hotelling’s rule can be interpreted as
the following. At each point in time the firm extracts the resource until current discounted marginal profits equal discounted marginal profits that could be obtained
by reallocating extraction to any other time. That is, in equilibrium, the discounted
‘marginal profit’ from extraction must be equal for each point in time - the firm
cannot increase his total discounted profits by shifting extraction between periods.
The marginal profit is written in quotation marks because it captures not only
the marginal profit in the common sense, here given by [P − g(St )], but it takes
also into account additional costs in form of future higher extraction costs from
extracting the marginal unit of fossil fuels in the current period instead of leaving
it in the ground. This feature is determined by the stock depending extraction
costs function that is decreasing in the amount of fossil fuels in situ.
To derive the optimal extraction path, two further pieces of information are needed
beside the relative price path and the optimal time horizon given by infinity: the
demand function D(Pt ) and the optimal total amount of extraction. The assumption of a competitive market assures that the price clears the market, such that we
can derive the optimal extraction path considering that Rt = D(Pt ). The physical
constraint of total extraction is determined by the given initial amount, S0 that
coincides in our framework with the total optimal amount. This conclusion follows
from the determination of the optimal value of resource extraction, Rt , as well as
the amount of stock left, St , when t approaches infinity. Sinn (2008, 389) determines
three possible solutions: first, Rt as well as St approach zero in infinite time. Second,
Rt is bounded away from zero, while St becomes zero and vice versa. The second
possibility can be excluded because it is not admissible: the necessary conditions
dictates an infinite price as time approaches infinity [refer to equation (58)]. An
infinite price is linked to an extraction amount that approaches zero as demand goes
to zero which contradicts the assumption that the extraction amount approaches a
finite level. The third possibility presented by Sinn (2008) has St being bounded
away from zero, while Rt becomes zero. This means that the transversality condition
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can only be satisfied if λt goes to zero when time approaches infinity. However, this
possibility is excluded by the dynamic constraint. As Rt goes to zero when time
approaches infinity, the growth rate of the shadow value converges to r and hence
does not approach zero. Instead, the transversality condition can only be satisfied
if Rt goes to zero and this is captured in the first possibility considered by Sinn
(2008). It follows that as times approaches infinity, both, Rt and St converge to
zero. q.e.d.
In conclusion, the knowledge of the optimal price path, the demand function, the
optimal extraction horizon, and the total optimal amount of fossil fuel extracted
allows for the determination of the unique optimal extraction levels for any period
t over the complete time horizon under business-as-usual conditions.

A.3 Policy scenarios
The aim of this section is to explore the optimal extraction behavior under different
tax schemes and their difference to the business-as-usual path. To do this, the
framework presented in the first section is extended by a constant and increasing cash flow tax and a constant and increasing sales tax. The tax factor of the
∗
cash flow tax for any t is given by θt∗ = θ0∗ · eθ̂t , with θ0∗ > 0, and θ̂∗ < 0. θ0∗ =
1 − τ0∗ while τt is the tax rate as a percentage. The tax base of the cash flow tax
constitutes the firm’s profit from extraction [Pt − g(St )] · Rt at any time. The
constant tax factor of the sales tax (or, alternatively, a constant demand decrease)
is given by θ > 0, with θ = 1 − τ and τ being the tax rate. The appendix explores later the impact of an increasing sales tax. The tax base of the sales tax is
the amount of fossil fuel sold in any period, valued by its market price, that is Rt ·Pt .
The firm’s maximization problem facing the different tax schemes is expressed by
Z
M ax.

∞

∗

θ0∗ · eθ̂t · [Pt · θ − g(St )] · Rt · e−rt dt

(59)

0

subject to
Ṡt = −Rt ,

(60)
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Rt ≥ 0, S0 given, and limt→∞ St ≥ 0.

The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is
Hct = θ0∗ · [Pt · θ − g(St )] · Rt − λt · Rt ,

(61)

∗

with λt = µt · e(r−θ̂ )t .
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum include the static efficiency
condition,
∂Hct
(62)
= θ0∗ · [Pt · θ − g(St )] − λt = 0,
∂Rt
the dynamic efficiency condition,
λ̇t = (r − θ̂∗ ) · λt + g 0 (St ) · Rt ,

(63)

and the transversality condition,
limt→∞ θ0∗ · e(−r+θ̂

∗ )t

· St · λt = 0,

(64)

The static and dynamic efficiency conditions yield the solution for the optimal
relative price path depending on different policy scenarios:
Ṗt = (r − θ̂∗ )(Pt −

g(St )
).
θ

(65)

It has been argued in the main text that the change in the price path alone determines the appearance of a Green Paradox. This is linked to the fact that the
implementation of the tax schemes considered does not change the total amount extracted, neither the time frame in which that happens. While the time to exhaustion
is the same by assumption (going from zero to infinity), the necessary conditions
require again that Rt and St converge zero when time goes to infinity and hence an
optimal total amount of fossil fuel extracted given by the initial amount S0 . While
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this has been proved in the section regarding the business-as-usual scenario, here is
simply referred to the proof without undertaking it again. In fact, following the
rationale of the proof above, it becomes clear that the implementation of a tax
does not change the optimality condition of Rt and St converging to zero as time
goes to infinity.
First, the optimal price path under a constant cash flow tax is explored. It is
c
denominated by Ṗt and given by
P˙tc = r · [Pt − g(St )].

(66)

The optimal price path is equal to the business-as-usual path. This implies that the
implementation of a constant cash flow tax does not change the extraction path and
hence has no effect on the climate. To give some intuition, note that the implementation of this tax scheme absorbs a constant fraction of the profit at each point in time
and is equivalent to a tax that absorbs a fraction of the total discounted profit equal
to the constant tax rate. From this it becomes clear that the firm sticks to the extraction path that was optimal without a tax because it assures profit maximization.
An increasing cash flow tax causes the optimal price path to become steeper
compared to the business-as-usual path. This can be seen from the resulting
optimal price path given by
ic

Ṗt = (r − θ̂∗ ) · [Pt − g(St )].

(67)

That is, a Green Paradox occurs as extraction starts at a higher level compared to
the business-as-usual scenario. The firm sells more in the earlier periods to avoid
the higher tax burden in the future. This leads to a decrease in current prices and
higher prices in the future because of more scarcity. The higher prices in the future
are due to the higher tax burden: future prices have to increase compared to the
business-as-usual path to compensate for the higher tax rates.
The optimal price path under a constant sales tax, is expressed by the following
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equation,

g(St )
.
Ṗt = r · Pt −
θ
s



(68)

The implementation of a constant sales tax leads to an optimal price path that is
flatter than under business-as-usual assumptions. As a consequence, the optimal
initial price must be higher and initial extraction levels are lower. Hence, a constant
sales tax represents an an effective policy tool to limit climate change.
If a constant sales tax flattens the extraction path, the impact of an increasing
sales tax is ambiguous regarding to its impact on the extraction path. In fact,
Sinn (ibid, 379) points out that there exists a rate of increase for the ad valorem
tax rate, τ̂ , for which the firm does not modify its extraction decisions after the
implementation of the tax. In particular, the rate of increase must be such that the
absolute discounted tax wedge (given by τt · Pt · e−rt ) is constant over time. In other
words, the amount of money to be paid due to the tax must increase over time
with the interest rate. Long and Sinn (1985, 281/282) showed that this is satisfied
if the growth rate of the tax equals the difference between the interest rate, r, and
the growth rate of the price, P̂t , that would have prevailed in the business-as-usual
scenario. This condition determines what Sinn (2008, 379) called the ”borderline
case for ad valorem tax neutrality” and is given by
τˆt = r − P̂t ,

(69)

with τt = τ0 · eτ̂ t representing the tax rate in period t.
The formal derivation is obtained as follows. It is assumed that the firm sticks to
its extraction decision that were optimal in the business-as-usual scenario after the
implementation of a sales tax τt increasing with τ̂ = (r − p̂). The current value
Hamiltonian is given by,
Hct = [Pt − g(St )] · Rt − τt · Pt · Rt − λt · R,

(70)

∗

with λt = µt · e(r−θ̂ )t . Under the assumption that the firm sticks to the extraction
path that has been optimal in the business-as-usual scenario, the optimal price
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path is given by equation (58) and here expressed as P˙t∗ = r · [Pt ∗ − g(St∗ )]. However,
the firm’s decision can only be optimal if the necessary conditions are still satisfied.
These are given by the static efficiency condition,
[Pt∗ − g(St∗ )] − τt · Pt = λt ,

(71)

the dynamic efficiency condition,
λ̇t = r · λt + g 0 (St∗ ) · Rt∗ ,

(72)

and the transversality condition,
limt→∞ e−rt · St · λt = 0,

(73)

Differentiating the static efficiency condition to time t yields,
∗

∗

λ̇t = Ṗt + g 0 (St∗ ) · Rt∗ − (Ṗt · τt + τˆt · Pt ∗ ).

(74)

Inserting the static efficiency condition into the dynamic efficiency condition yields
a dynamic efficiency condition given by
λ̇t = r · [Pt∗ − g(St∗ ) − r · τt · Pt∗ ].

(75)

The necessary conditions are yielding an optimal extraction path that is identical
to the business-as-usual price path only if,
∗

r · τt · Pt∗ = (Ṗt · τt + τˆt · Pt ∗ ).

(76)

In words, the discounted amount of tax paid at each point in time must be constant
and this requires that the growth rate of the tax, τˆt , is equal to (r − P̂t ). q.e.d.
In conclusion, a sales tax that is growing by more than the threshold value over
time, it is optimal for the fossil fuel firm to accelerate extraction thereby generating
a Green Paradox. The opposite is true for a sales tax which grows at a rate less
than (r − P̂t ), and hence this policy is effective to limit climate change.
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Note however that if the initial value of the sales tax is high enough, the optimal
price path must start at a higher level in order for extraction still being profitable.
The price path will in consequence be higher than the business-as-usual price path
such that some of the fossil fuel resources remain unextracted8 .

A.4 A graphical representation of the Green Paradox
The aim of this section is to derive figure 1 of the main text that depicts the
optimal extraction paths in the business-as-usual scenario, with an increasing cash
flow tax and a decreasing cash flow tax. An increasing cash flow tax represents the
extraction path that coincides with a Green Paradox, while a decreasing tax flattens
the extraction path and hence provides an effective policy to combat climate change.
Following the approach of Lasserre (1991, 86), a graphical representation of the
optimal extraction paths derived above is possible in a (R, t) diagram. This differs
from the approach of Sinn (2008), who presented a diagram with a (R, S) dimension.
The graphical representation in the (R, t) scheme is chosen because it focuses on
the variable of main interest for the purpose of the Green Paradox discussion: the
time path of fossil fuel extraction.
The graphical presentation of the different extraction programs in a (R, t) diagram
is possible after deriving the slope of the extraction path. It is clear that obtaining
the slope is sufficient as the optimal amount of extraction, given by S0 , and the time
frame until exhaustion, given by infinity, hold for all scenarios and have already

8

For a further discussion see Edenhofer and Kalkuhl (2011, 2209). Under a framework in line
with the one proposed by Sinn (2008), but with constant extraction costs, they are calculating
a critical initial value for a unit tax that leads to incomplete exhaustion of the fossil fuels. In
particular, consider the case of a unit tax with an initial value exceeding the first period’s net
profit (the scarcity rent) that would have been optimal without taxation. If the tax is furthermore
increasing with the interest rate, then the consumer price that will equal the tax and extraction
costs “is at each point in time strictly higher than in the no-tax case”. This leads to a decrease
in demand for all periods, leaving some of the fossil fuels unextracted. Note that their result
can be applied to a sales tax as it is possible to transform any unit tax into an equivalent ad
valorem tax.
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been proved. To derive the slope replace Pt and Ṗt respectively with P (Rt ) and
P 0 (Rt ) · Ṙt within the respective optimal price paths stated in equations (58) and
(65). Dividing the expressions by P 0 (Rt ) yields the slope for the optimal extraction
paths for the business-as-usual scenario
∂Rtbau
r[P (Rt ) − g(S t bau )]
=
,
∂t
P 0 (R)

(77)

as well as for the cash flow scenario,
(r − θ̂∗ )[P (Rt ) − g(Sttax )]
∂Rtic
=
,
∂t
P 0 (R)

(78)

with θ̂∗ < 0 and θ̂∗ > 0 respectively for the cases where the cash flow tax is
increasing and decreasing. First, the extraction paths for the business-as-usual as
well as the policy scenario with an increasing cash flow tax are graphically derived.
Note that the area under both curves has to be identical as it has been shown
that the total amount extracted is given by the initial amount S0 in all scenarios.
Furthermore, extraction activities in both scenarios go to zero as time approaches
infinity. This leads to two possible conclusions: the extraction paths are identical
or they intersect at least once. It can be shown that they intersect once and that
the amount extracted in initial periods are higher for the policy scenario with an
increasing cash flow tax compared to the business-as-usual scenario. To prove this,
assume that at one point in time, denoted by t, the amount extracted are identical
for both scenarios, formally, Rtbau = Rtic . At t, the two slopes stated in equations
(77) and (78) have the three possible relationships,
r[P (Rt ) − g(Stbau )] <=> (r − θ̂∗ )[P (Rt ) − g(Sttax )].

(79)

Consider first the possibility that the slopes are equal at time t. This would imply
that extraction levels must be equal for each point in time in order to satisfy the
conditions that the areas under the curve and the time frame of exhaustion are
identical for both scenarios. This possibility is clearly contradicted by (79) that
requires a greater slope for the policy scenario compared to the business-as-usual
scenario following the assumption of identical extraction paths until t. Next, con-
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sider that the slope for the business-as-usual path is greater. A greater slope for the
business-as-usual path at t indicates that the extraction path cut the extraction
path optimal in the tax scenario from above. Hence, total extraction until t is
greater for the business-as-usual case such that g(Stbau ) > g(Sttax ). With the price
being equal in both scenarios, this leads undoubtedly to the conclusion that the
policy extraction path has a higher slope at t. However, this contradicts the initial
assumption that the slope at this point in time is greater for the business-as-usual
path. The only possible solution is that at t the optimal extraction path for the
policy scenario has a higher slope and hence it is cut from above by the businessas-usual extraction path. That is, until time t, extraction levels are higher for the
policy scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario, while this is reversed for
all periods until infinity after time t. Regarding the slopes for the optimal extraction
path of the decreasing cash flow tax and the the business-as-usual scenario, the
opposite is true. The slope of the business-as-usual scenario is greater and hence
the extraction path cut the extraction path for the policy scenario from above. q.e.d.
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